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Abstract: In light of proposals for Eurobonds, this article explores central legal
features of the Eurobond proposals. Section 2 focuses on the development of the
law governing sovereign bonds and assesses the potential, but limited role of
international law for Eurobonds. Section 3 considers the equal treatment of
bondholders, looking at the two potential sources of non-discrimination obliga-
tions for sovereign bonds and their relevance to Eurobonds. Section 4 turns to
two crucial design features of Eurobonds which existing proposals mostly
address only in passing: (i) which legal entity issues Eurobonds; and (ii) what
form of debt mutualization Eurobonds involve.
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1 Introduction
Sovereign bonds are contracts closely linked to the functioning of the State.
Their character has gradually and partially shifted over the last 200 years, from
public to private contracting. In particular, whereas in the nineteenth century
the law of the sovereign debtor invariably applied to sovereign bonds, the choice
of an external governing law has become increasingly common over the course
of the twentieth century.
The article shows that there are no fundamental legal obstacles to the
introduction of Eurobonds1 if the 19 Eurozone member states were to reach a
political agreement on their introduction. There are no likely avenues for
Eurobonds to be challenged under international law.
This article is structured into three sections. Section 2 examines the law
governing sovereign bonds. Section 3 considers the equal treatment of bond-
holders. Section 4 turns to two important design features of Eurobonds which
*Corresponding author: Michael Waibel, Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, University of
Cambridge, CB3 9BL Cambridge, E-mail: mww27@cam.ac.uk
1 This article does not consider potential obstacles under European Union law. See Jörn Axel
Kämmerer’s article in this issue.
Rev. Law Econ. 2016; 12(3): 635–657
Brought to you by | Cambridge University Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 9/5/17 1:01 PM
existing proposals mostly address only in passing: (i) which legal entity issues
the Eurobonds; and (ii) what form of debt mutualization do the bonds involve.
2 The relevance of international law to Eurobonds
The proper law for sovereign bonds has long been controversial. Historically,
contracts whereby states or their subnational entities borrow money from private
creditors2 were subject to the rebuttable presumption that the law of the borrow-
ing state applied (Borchard and Wynne, 1951:67; Mann, 1973; Lalive, 1962:434).
Financial instruments issued by the State in its territory were seen as “creatures”
of the law of the latter. Traditionally then, the law of the issuing country governs
sovereign bonds.
Sovereign bonds are never governed by international law (Megliani, 2014:105;
Farchy, 2016).3 This fact does not imply that international law is altogether irrelevant
for sovereign bonds in general, and Eurobonds in particular. International law is
potentially relevant because the borrowers are states or international organizations,
and international law applies to both as subjects of international law. But it does not
follow that their bonds are governed by international law. For Eurobonds, there are at
least three possibilities as to who could issue them: (1) Eurozone member states
collectively; (2) a future or existing international organization, such as the European
Stability Mechanism (ESM); (3) a private financing vehicle such as the European
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). In the first two scenarios, international law would
play some role because the issuer is a subject of international law.
Yet the role of international law for Eurobonds is probably going to be
limited. Eurobonds, like all other existing sovereign bonds, are likely to be
governed by some domestic law, rather than international law. Irrespective of
the format of Eurobonds, international law will not govern them.
International law would apply largely in the background and only to spe-
cific issues. Consider the following three issues that depend at least partly on
2 Mount Albert Borough Council v. Australasian Temperance and General Mutual Life Assurance
Society, [1938] A. C. 224, 239.
3 Even the Ukrainian bond held by the Russian Federation from issuance is governed by English
law, rather than international law, Ukraine U.S. $1,984,838,000 5.00% Notes due 2015, see Farchy
(2016). Ukraine defaulted on this bond at the end of 2015, and the Russian Federation contemplated
litigation before the English courts, see Khan (2016). Occasionally, inter-governmental loans are
concluded in treaty form and governed by international law, but this is nowadays very rare, e. g.
“Agreement Dated 10 December 2010 £3,226,960,000 Credit Facility for Ireland Provided by The
Commisioners of Her Majesty’s Treasury” (2010) (governed by English law).
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customary international law: (1) whether it is possible to sue a state in the courts
of another state for disputes arising out of the sovereign bond (sovereign
immunity) (Yang, 2015; Fox and Webb, 2013);4 (2) how responsibility for servi-
cing bonds is divided in cases of state succession and a possible break-up of the
Eurozone (Stanic, 2001);5 and (3) possible state defenses based on the a state’s
temporary inability to service its bonds, or its inability to pay, such as economic
necessity (Sykes, 2015). Investment treaties may provide a measure of protection
to the holders of Eurobonds – though arbitral tribunals are divided on whether
investment tribunals have jurisdiction over sovereign bonds (see Section 3).
2.1 Does international law prevent the introduction
of Eurobonds?
The answer is almost certainly no. No rule of international law presents
obstacles to the introduction of Eurobonds – this is not surprising given that
sovereign bonds are not, as explained below, governed by international law.
Moreover, international law does not, as a rule, prevent states from entering
into commercial transactions as they see fit. It is only when it comes to
defaults on Eurobonds, or their eventual restructuring, that international law
may place outer limits on how such restructuring may be achieved. Provided
there is political agreement on the introduction of Eurozone, financial market
lawyers will be able to devise a structure for the issuance of Eurobonds that
will survive legal challenges.6 Creative lawyers and policymakers came up
with the structure of the ESM – which survived challenge in Pringle (De
Witte and Beulkers, 2013)7 – and they would be able to achieve the same
outcome for Eurobonds if asked.
4 In practice, domestic codifications such as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in the
United States (FSIA) and the State Immunity Act (SIA) in the UK determine whether or not a
borrowing state benefits from sovereign immunity. It is today widely recognized, following
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc. 504 US 607 (1992), that sovereign bonds are commercial
transactions that do not attract any immunity. Moreover, both the FSIA and the SIA provide that
sovereigns can waive their immunity from jurisdiction in the courts of other states, which they
routinely do, though the terms of such waivers vary.
5 E.g. the break-up of Former Yugoslavia and the associated questions of how the responsibility
for servicing the debt is divided among the successor states.
6 Particularly EU and constitutional challenges.
7 Thomas Pringle v. The Government of Ireland, Ireland and the Attorney General, C-370/12,
Judgement, 27 November 2012.
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2.2 Bonds governed by domestic and external domestic law
A bond is a contract according to which, in exchange for credit, bondholders are
repaid the principal on maturity and receive a stream of regular interest pay-
ments over time. For medium and long term sovereign debt securities issued
(i. e. whose maturity is greater than one year), a common distinction is between
notes (medium term) and bonds (long term). Many countries issue a couple of
different types of debt securities: France issues Bons du Trésor à intérêts annuels
(BTAN) and Obligations Assimilable du Trésor (OAT), Germany Schätze, Bobls
and Bunds, the United Kingdom Gilts and the United States T-Notes and T-Bonds.
A first category of bonds is governed by domestic law and subject to the
jurisdiction of domestic courts. These bonds are typically issued under domestic
statutes or otherwise under domestic law and have retained their “public”
character. Their key features – the lack of choice of law clauses, the limited or
non-existent documentation and the absence of an express provision for access
to the ordinary (civil) courts – underscores their public character. For example,
the documentation of US Treasury bills, UK Gilts, French Trésors and German
Bunds8 typically sets out the basic financial terms and certain modalities for the
issuance and trading of the instruments, but contains few or no covenants
protecting holders of these instruments.9 Covenants are important to creditors
because their breach leads to an event of default, thereby encouraging the state
to repay its bonds and loans (Wood, 2007:8–01). This article touches on two
types of covenants: (i) the negative pledge and (ii) pari passu clauses.
Eurozone countries, like other OECD countries, largely issue bonds with no
or only limited documentation, with few or no legal protections for bondholders.
Countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany, France and the United States
issue all of their debt under their own law and subject to the jurisdiction of their
own courts. Domestic bonds typically lack an express choice-of-law provision,
and are often deemed to be subject to the sovereign borrower’s law (IMF,
2004:14). These bonds also typically lack waivers of immunity from jurisdiction
and enforcement. Legal protections in case of a default or restructuring on
domestic bonds are minimal (Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer, 2006:56).
8 Bekanntmachung der Emissionsbedingungen für Bundesanleihen, Bundesobligationen,
Bundesschatzanweisungen und unverzinsliche Schatzanweisungen des Bundes (Germany),
21 December 2012, VII A 2 – WK 2202/07/0001.
9 E.g. for Spain, the General Budgetary Law, Ley 47/2003, BOE Num. 285, 27 November 2003,
BOE-A-2003-21614, in conjunction with an annual ministerial order, Orden ECC/1/2014, “de 2 de
enero, por la que se dispone la creación de Deuda del Estado durante el año 2014 y enero de
2015 y se recogen las Cláusulas de Acción Colectiva normalizadas and a Resolution of the
General Secretariat of the Treasury and Financial Policy for each debt security”.
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By contrast, external bonds contain extensive documentation, with protec-
tions for bondholders such as negative pledges (Buchheit, 1992), pari passu
clauses (Chabot and Gulati, 2014) and events of default. Courts in important
financial centers such as London and New York routinely regard sovereign
bonds issued in this way as ordinary commercial transactions (UK Supreme
Court 2011, US Supreme Court 1992). The borrowing country virtually always
submits to the jurisdiction of the courts in an important financial center.
Furthermore, externally governed bonds typically include a broad waiver of
sovereign immunity from jurisdiction, if not enforcement.
The main Debt Issuance Program of the European Stability Mechanism does
not fit neatly in either category. These financial instruments are similar to those
of external sovereign bonds, with some variations. On the one hand, the govern-
ing law is English law. English courts have jurisdiction and the documentation is
more extensive than is typically the case for domestic law governed sovereign
debt instruments. Yet there are very few covenants in these debt instruments (no
negative pledge, no events of defaults).
2.3 The evolution of the law governing sovereign bonds
Until the twentieth century, virtually all sovereign bonds lacked an express
choice of law clause and were impliedly governed by domestic law, including
bonds issued by peripheral countries in Latin America and Asia (Delaume,
1967:92; Stowe, 2002; League of Nations, 1939:74–75).10 Bonds were widely
regarded as quintessential “public” law contracts, and the idea that States
would ever subject themselves to another country’s laws when issuing bonds
was unthinkable. Sovereign bonds were regarded as so closely connected to the
exercise of a State’s public functions and the exercise of its sovereignty that a
State would never subject itself to another State’s laws.
Over the course of the twentieth century, the view that countries subject
themselves to an external private law when borrowing abroad gained ground
(Borchard and Wynne, 1951:4). The express submission to the external law of an
important financial center became more common, particularly for less credit-
worthy countries. Conversely, sovereign bonds issued on international capital
markets and governed by some external law such as English or New York are
nowadays widely considered to be archetypical private law contracts.
10 Smith v. Weguelin and Others, [1869] L.R. 8 Equity, London Cases 198; Payment of Various
Serbian Loans Issued in France, France v Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Judgment,
PCIJ 260 Series A no 20 (PCIJ 1929).
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In the 1930s, the issue of governing law for sovereign bonds had divided the
House of Lords and the lower courts in Rex v. International Trustee for the
Protection of Bondholders.11 The case concerned UK bonds issued in New York,
and payable at the holder’s option in either London or New York. The bonds
were silent on which law governed them. The Court of Appeal, upholding the
trial court, had adopted the presumption that in case of doubt the sovereign’s
own law applied. Yet the House of Lords broke new ground finding that New
York law applied under ordinary conflict of laws principles. That the UK was
party to the contract deserved great weight but did not compel the conclusion
that English law governed the contract.
After World War II, official loans by one State to another were often modeled
on private loans and it became common to choose some domestic law as the
governing law. International lending transactions more generally came to be
often governed by the domestic law of the intermediaries arranging the transac-
tion, in many cases English and US investment banks and law firms.
From the point of view of creditors, an important advantage of choosing an
external law is the large degree of insulation in debt restructurings, when com-
pared to bonds governed by domestic law. Domestic-law governed bonds give
States far greater room for maneuver in financial distress than external bonds, as
illustrated most recently by the Greek sovereign debt restructuring in March 2012.
Greece restructured its domestic bond stock by retrofitting collective action clauses
(CACs) onto its Greek-law governed bonds, and then using them to incentivize
participation in the exchange offer (Zettelmeyer et al., 2013:513–63, Kupelyants,
2015:Ch6).
The Greek debt restructuring in 2012 and the Argentine pari passu litigation
in New York illustrate how central the choice of governing law and jurisdiction is
to the success of sovereign debt restructurings. On the one hand, the fact that
most of Greece’s bonds were governed by local law12 greatly facilitated the debt
workout process thanks to a change in Greek legislation to retroactively include
CACs (Zettelmeyer et al., 2013). On the other hand, the choice of New York law as
the governing law of the bonds and New York City as the place of jurisdiction in
NML v. Argentina stacked the deck in favor of holdout creditors,13 as compared
to bonds governed by domestic law and subject to domestic jurisdiction. It
triggered Argentina’s second default in 14 years.
11 Rex v. International Trustee for the Protection of Bondholders A.G, [1937] AC 500.
12 See Reserve Bank of Australia Statement on Monetary Policy (May 2012), Box B: of the €206
billion bonds of the 2012 restructuring, Greek law bonds amounted to €177 billion, i. e. 86% .
13 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12, 105 (2d Cir. 2012); NML Capital, Ltd. v.
Republic of Argentina, No. 12, 105 (2nd Cir. 2013).
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New York and English laws are the most widely used external governing
laws. The governing law for emerging markets’ sovereign bonds over 1987–1997
was distributed as follows: 41.5% of bonds were governed by NY law, 26.6% by
English law, 19.2% by German law and 11.3% by Japanese law (Hallak, 2011).
The share of German and Japanese law as governing law of sovereign bonds has
declined over time (Gulati and Scott, 2012).
The increased use of Euro Medium Term Note (EMTN) programs following
the introduction of the Euro led issuing Eurozone countries to systematically
choose English law as the governing law. A few exceptions remain, such as
Belgium and Italy, which also issue under New York law. This trend towards
English law has been especially pronounced for European countries that pre-
viously issued under German or French law. The external legal advisors for these
issuing countries, often English law firms, may have also played a role (Gulati
and Scott, 2012).
The main question with respect to governing law of Eurobonds is which
domestic governing law will Eurozone member states choose. A choice of
German law as the governing law could be a compromise and provide assurance
to the German public (in preference to English or New York law). A possible
downside is that a German-law governed Eurobonds might not gain market
acceptance as quickly as a New York or English-law governed one, given the
tiny share of German-law governed sovereign bonds today (less than one percent
of the total outstanding external bonds).
Following this treatment of the governing law of existing sovereign bonds,
the next section considers whether there are any rules of international law that
limit the extent to which states can differentiate among creditors in sovereign
debt restructurings. It also considers two important covenants, pari passu and
negative pledge clauses, in this context, and their implications for Eurobonds.
3 Equal treatment of bondholders
Crucial for a possible equal treatment obligation is what the governing law says
on the equal treatment of bondholders. As this section shows, there is no general
equal treatment obligation as regards sovereign borrowing. There are two poten-
tial sources of non-discrimination obligations for sovereign bonds. First, cove-
nants in the contracts underlying the bonds. And second, international law in
the form of international investment law. This section first considers contracts,
before examining the potential impact of obligations under investment treaties.
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3.1 Contractual obligations not to discriminate
With regard to possible contractual non-discrimination obligations, it all
depends on whether the issuer includes covenants to that effect in the debt
instruments. But even if the issuer includes such covenants, they are limited in
crucial respects, and typically fall far short of an affirmative equal treatment
obligation.
Several Eurobond proposals envisage debt instruments with different prior-
ity ranking.14 From the perspective of international law, such a hierarchy among
creditors is unproblematic. In fact, debt instruments governed by some domestic
law are beyond the scope of application of international law at the point of
issuance. As discussed in the previous section, it is likely that international law
does not even come into play at the point of issuance, because some domestic
law, rather than international law, will govern them.
Even if Eurozone member states were to choose international law as the
governing law for Eurobonds (a choice that is extremely unlikely, and would
almost certainly be ill-advised in view of market practice and marketability),
they would be free to design Eurobonds as comprised of senior and junior bonds
(or any other permutation of seniority) without violating a purported rule of
international law requiring equal creditor treatment in all circumstances.
Ex ante, when one or several states consider in what form to issue bonds or
other debt instruments, they are free to adopt any seniority structure they like.
Just like it is perfectly possible in domestic laws to create senior, junior, or
mezzanine debt, the same is true of Eurobonds. What is not possible, as a rule,
is to discriminate within a particular class of creditors ex post. But ex ante, the
principle of party autonomy – in this case the autonomy of the issuer to choose
the priority structure it sees fit – reigns supreme.
Importantly, even taken together, the negative pledge and the pari passu
clause fall short of a general, contractual equal treatment obligation. Not only
do they often have significant, built-in limitations (e. g. they apply only to
external indebtedness such that the borrower is free to differentiate between
domestic and external indebtedness), but both are negative obligations not to
grant security (negative pledge) and not to subordinate beneficiary creditors.
There is no general, positive obligation to treat all creditors equally, or to treat
all creditors “in like circumstances” equally.
14 E.g. senior “blue bonds” and junior “red bonds” in Delpla and von Weizsäcker (2010) and
senior and junior tranches in the ESBies proposal of Euro-nomics in Brunnermeier et al. (2011).
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The negative pledge is a contractual obligation by borrowers to preserve the
position of unsecured creditors. A simple negative pledge provides: “The bor-
rower will not create or permit to exist any security interest on any of its assets”.
The borrower promises not to encumber its assets for the benefit of other
creditors.
Negative pledge clauses constrain the debtor’s ability to pledge collateral
going forward (Scott and Gelpern, 2012:1258; Feilchenfeld, 1934:635; Martha,
2015:491). Borrowers commit not to grant security to other creditors, or in the
alternative, to grant equivalent security to the creditors benefitting from the
negative pledge. Negative pledges seek to ensure that unsecured creditors are
not worse off. They do not give them any sort of priority vis-à-vis other unse-
cured creditors.
In sovereign bonds, the negative pledge is often limited to external indebt-
edness, defined variably as bonds in foreign currency, or issued with non-
residents in mind. Negative pledges provide much less protection to creditors
than security, because they do not restrict other unsecured liabilities ranking
equally, nor do they allocate specific assets to the service of the loan. As a result,
debt dilution through additional unsecured debt is perfectly possible (Chatterjee
and Burcu, 2012; IMF, 2004).
A standard pari passu clause provides as follows: “The borrower’s obligations
under the loan agreement will rank pari passu with all its other unsecured
liabilities”. Pari passu clauses do not guarantee equal payment in fact; rather,
they only protect creditors from having lower priority than other unsecured
creditors.
Under the traditional interpretation, the debtor does not promise to pay
creditors pro rata in default. The debtor only promises creditors not to sub-
ordinate their debt to others. Subordination of a creditor occurs where one
creditor, the “subordinated” or “junior” creditor, agrees not to be paid by a
debtor until another creditor, the “senior” creditor, of the common debtor has
been paid (Calligar, 1960). According to this interpretation, then, pari passu
too does not amount to an equal treatment guarantee of creditors benefitting
from the clause.
On the alternative, ratable payment interpretation of the pari passu clause,
whenever the borrower pays any creditor, it has to make ratable payments to its
other covered creditors. The 1989 case of Elliot Associates v Banco de la Nacion
rested on such a broad interpretation of the pari passu clause. The Belgian courts
recognized that Elliot had the right to receive a proportional share of Peru’s
payments on external debt. More recently, Judge Griesa of the Southern District
Court of New York adopted this ratable payment interpretation in litigation related
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to Argentina’s restructuring.15 Some recent boilerplate pari passu clauses expressly
repudiate the ratable payment interpretation of the clause.16
3.2 Obligations not to discriminate under investment treaties
With respect to international investment law, it is only ex post, at the point of a
sovereign debt restructuring, that international law may, in extreme cases, come
into play if the debtor discriminates between creditor classes and (1) the bonds
do not already provide for or (2) such discrimination lacks any rational basis.
Particularly problematic is nationality-based discrimination, i. e. a sovereign’s
decision to only restructure bonds held by, say, German nationals or residents.
Conversely, there is no rule of general international law that different categories
of creditors need to be treated equally. The only type of differentiation that may
be problematic is nationality-based discrimination under investment treaties
(Waibel, 2007).
Consider these two illustrations of differential treatment that are likely to be
permissible under international law. First, more favorable treatment of pension
funds as compared to other asset managers would likely have a rational basis.
So would the preferential treatment of bond holdings of national central banks
and the European Central Bank. In the Greek restructuring of 2012, Greece issued
a new International Security Identification Number (ISIN) to bonds held by the
European Central Bank and national central banks not long before the restruc-
turing, and subsequently did not include the bonds with this new ISIN in the
restructuring (Trebesch and Zettelmeyer, 2014).17 Some creditors alleged unsuc-
cessfully that this re-numbering of the bonds held by the ECB subordinated
15 NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12, 105 (2d Cir. 2012); NML Capital, Ltd. v.
Republic of Argentina, No. 12, 105 (2nd Cir. 2013). The English courts have thus far not followed
the lead of New York courts on this issue, see Knighthead Master Fund LLP v. The Bank of New
York Mellon, [2015] EWHC 270 (Ch).
16 E.g. International Capital Market Association, Standard Clause, May 2015: “The Notes are the
direct, unconditional and unsecured obligations of the Issuer and rank and will rank pari passu,
without preference among themselves, with all other unsecured External Indebtedness of the
Issuer, from time to time outstanding, provided, further, that the Issuer shall have no obligation
to effect equal or rateable payment(s) at any time with respect to any such other External
Indebtedness and, in particular, shall have no obligation to pay other External Indebtedness at
the same time or as a condition of paying sums due on the Notes and vice versa”.
17 An International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) uniquely identifies a financial
instrument. It is based on ISO 6166 of the International Organization for Standardization.
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private creditors to the ECB in a way that triggered a restructuring credit event.18
The same result likely applies under bilateral investment treaties.
A limited equal treatment obligation may apply under international invest-
ment treaties, provided Eurobonds qualify as an “investment” for the purposes
of these treaties.19 But authorities are divided on whether sovereign bonds
qualify as investments in the first place. Most-favored nation (MFN) and national
treatment (NT) clauses in investment treaties protect foreign investors (which
may include bondholders) from nationality-based discrimination. MFN prevents
discrimination among investors of different nationalities20 NT prevents discrimi-
nation between foreign investors covered by the investment treaty in question
and domestic investors. The NT and MFN clauses in BITs allow bondholders to
assert discrimination based on nationality. Neither clause is likely to come into
play in our context.
De jure discrimination arises from explicit nationality-based distinctions
contained in legal texts, and is very unlikely to have much purchase in modern
sovereign debt restructurings. No restructuring since 1945 seems to have de jure
discriminated based on nationality. Foreign bondholders increasingly buy bonds
issued only domestically (e. g. Russia’s restructuring in 1998 or Greece’s restruc-
turing in 2012), and domestic bondholders buy debt issued internationally. So
even if a country restructures only its debt issued internationally (or only debt
issued domestically, e. g. Russia in 1998), the restructuring will affect both
nationals and non-nationals of the debtor country.
Sovereign debt restructurings today often take the form of a bond exchange,
where the sovereign offers all its bondholders to exchange old for new bonds
with lower payments. The primary fault line of discrimination is between bond-
holders who participate in a restructuring and those who choose to retain their
18 ISDA EMEA DC, Issue Number 2012022401, 22 February 2012 (alleging that the European
Central Bank and National Central Banks benefited from “a change in the ranking in priority of
payment” as a result of the Hellenic Republic exclusively offering them the ability to exchange
out of their “eligible instruments” prior to the exchange and implementation of the CACs,
thereby effectively “causing the Subordination” of all remaining holders of eligible
instruments).
19 ICSID tribunals affirmed jurisdiction over sovereign bonds in Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011
of The European Parliament and of The Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and
correction of macroeconomic imbalances, Official Journal of the European Union; Ambiente
Ufficio S.p.A. and others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/9 (2013) (formerly
Giordano Alpi and others v. Argentine Republic) but declined jurisdiction in Poštová Banka
and Istrokapital v Hellenic Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/8 (2015). The Argentina cases settled
in 2016 following the election of new Argentinean president Macri.
20 Such discrimination occurred in the 1930s, when Germany defaulted on bondholders of
certain nationalities.
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old bonds, rather than discrimination by nationality of the bondholders (Waibel,
2007). While perhaps domestic bondholders are more likely to participate in a
restructuring than foreign nationals due to moral suasion by the official sector
(e. g. pension funds or banks in the debtor country), both domestic and foreign
nationals are likely not to participate in the debt restructuring.
By contrast, de facto discrimination involves factually disparate treatment of
investors/investments of different nationalities. Identifying de facto discrimina-
tion raises more complex questions. In investment law, foreign investors need to
meet at least two conditions for a successful non-discrimination claim: (i) less
favorable treatment in relation to (ii) a comparable domestic investor (for
national treatment) or a comparable foreign investor (for MFN). Not all differ-
ential treatment breaches these two non-discrimination obligations. A crucial
question is the choice of the comparator (“in like circumstances”). Some tribu-
nals adopt a broad likeness test, giving broader reach to the non-discrimination
obligation because the class of investors being compared is broader.21 In addi-
tion, some tribunals require evidence that the discrimination be driven by
protectionist motives, with the result that a showing of discrimination is sig-
nificantly harder.22
Domestic debt is often restructured under different terms than external debt.
A national treatment claim could arise if a foreign bondholder suffered a deeper
haircut in the external debt restructuring than a national bondholder affected by
the domestic debt restructuring. However, since the original debt instruments
will often differ substantially in their legal and financial terms, de facto dis-
crimination tends to be very difficult to prove in practice.
Over time, informal seniority regimes have developed for sovereign debt
(Wood, 1982) and are often used and seemingly accepted. These priorities are
not underpinned by legal rules; rather they arise de facto through market
practice, such as the exclusion of trade credit and other short-term lending
from sovereign debt restructurings. In addition, multilateral debt has typically
been excluded from sovereign debt restructurings altogether.23 The International
Monetary Fund enjoys informal priority of payment (Martha, 1990; Raffer, 2005;
Boudreau and Gulati, 2014).24 The Paris Club restructures official debt. While
21 See, for instance, Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. The Republic of Ecuador,
LCIA Case No. UN3467 (2004).
22 See, for instance, United Parcel Service of America v Government of Canada, Award on the
Merits, UNCITRAL (2007).
23 ISDA EMEA DC, Issue Number 2012022401, 22 February 2012.
24 Martha argued that the preferred creditor status of IFIs is grounded in customary interna-
tional law, but this view is not widely shared. For criticism see Raffer (2005).
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such restructurings are not formally required to be on the same terms as other
types of debt, the Paris Club itself typically insists on comparability of treatment
(in particular that private debt be restructured on similar terms).
An ISDA25 Determinations Committee affirmed with respect to the Irish IMF/
EU program that the mere existence of a de facto priority in favor of the
International Monetary Fund, based on market practice, did not trigger a
credit-restructuring event under credit default swaps.26 The reason for this
important qualification is found in Section 2.19(b) of the ISDA Definitions,
which contains an important qualification: “the existence of preferred creditors
arising by operation of law or of collateral, credit support or other credit
enhancements arrangements shall not be taken into account, except that, not-
withstanding the foregoing, priorities arising by operation of law shall be taken
into account where the Reference Entity is a Sovereign”. That market practice
establishes an informal priority in favor of the IMF is thus insufficient for CDS to
be triggered. So long as the ranking of creditors is not legally binding, no
restructuring is triggered (not “by operation of law”).
3.3 Implications for Eurobonds
As we have seen in this section, sovereign borrowers can limit their freedom to
differentiate among creditors when issuing the bonds by contract (rather than
international law) – and this is common in bonds governed by external law,
often with a view to increasing the marketability of the bonds, particularly for
countries with a checkered history of repayment. The two most important con-
tractual devices are negative pledge and pari passu clauses. They both limit the
debtor’s freedom to treat creditors preferentially but they do not amount to a
positive equal treatment obligation. They preserve the equal ranking of unse-
cured claims against the debtor’s assets, and prohibit subordination (Martha,
2015:421). As covenants, they need to be expressly included in the sovereign
bond documentation. For example, the ESM’s Medium-Term Note Program does
not contain either a negative pledge or a pari passu clause. As a result, even
these limited obligations do not apply to debt notes issued under this program.
25 The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) is a trade organization in the
market for over-the-counter derivatives. Headquartered in New York, it created a standardized
contract – the ISDA Master Agreement – for derivatives. Determinations committees are fact-
finding bodies with respect to the ISDA Master Agreement. See further Waibel (2014).
26 Republic of Ireland, Issue Number 2011031101, 11 March 2011; The Hellenic Republic, Issue
Number 2012022401, 22 February 2012 (ECB and national central bank priority).
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The Blue Bond proposal moves in the direction of an explicit seniority
structure for sovereign debt which the more recent sovereign debt literature
favors (Bolton and Jeanne, 2009; Chatterjee and Eyigungor, 2012; Gelpern,
2004; International Monetary Fund, 2004; Zettelmeyer, 2003; Tirole, 2002).
Because red bonds are reserved for indebtedness in excess of 60% of GDP,
the proposal gives seniority to those creditors who lent earlier in time. This
approximates a first-in-time priority rule and could help to prevent the extern-
ality of debt dilution. Assuming fixed creditworthiness, additional lending
dilutes existing debt.
Delpa and von Weizäcker’s blue/red bonds, if introduced, would almost
certainly not contain any pari passu clauses, and hence the seniority of the blue
bonds would not be problematic within the context of the blue/red bonds
themselves. Moreover, provided the issuer of blue bonds were an entity other
than the existing Eurozone sovereign borrowers, there would be no issue with
any pari passu clauses in existing Eurozone member state indebtedness because
such clauses only extend to the same issuer. It would equally be unproblematic
for more junior red bonds to be created by existing Eurozone member state
debtors.
4 The identity of the issuer and the modality
for mutualizing debt
This section considers two additional legal features of three Eurobond propo-
sals, and compares them to two existing institutions, the European Financial
Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The two
features are (1) the identity of the issuer and (2) the way in which the debt
obligations are “mutualized”.
4.1 The identity of the issuer
There are three main possibilities for who the issuer of Eurobonds could be: (1)
Eurozone member states collectively, following the model of the German Bund-
Länder-Anleihe of 2013; (2) an existing or future international organization
similar to the ESM; (3) a private entity modeled on the EFSF. The Blue/Red
Bond proposal leaves this question open, but as it does not mention any
organization, it is likely that the authors intended for the Eurozone member
states collectively to act as the issuer. The German Council of Economic Experts
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(2011) and the euro-nomics group (Brunnermeier et al. 2011) envisage dedicated
organizations to fulfill this task (the European Redemption Fund, and “a public
international institution”, respectively).
There does not necessarily need to be single issuer. The first option is for
the 17 Eurozone Countries to issue debt jointly (and assume a pro rata liability
for each Eurobond). With the German Bund-Länder-Anleihe, each of the 11
issuers is liable on a pro rata (proportionate) basis for its share (Deutsche
Finanzagentur, 2013).
The Federal Republic of Germany and ten German states issued this joint
bond “as several and not joint debtors”. The result is that each of the 11 issuers
can default individually and is severally liable for its share. § 3 of this bond
provides the liability shares for each of the 11 issuers, with North Rhine-
Westphalia’s share for example being 20% and the Federal Government’s
share being 13.5%. § 3 (2) provides that “Each Issuer shall be liable pro rata
for their own payment obligations arising from the Bonds. Under no circum-
stances shall an Issuer be liable for the default of the relevant other Issuers”.
This bond does not contain any provision for acceleration or events of
default. If the State of North Rhine-Westphalia, for example, defaulted, and
the other 10 issuers remain current on their debt, then principal repayments
need to be made by the non-defaulting issuers in accordance with the bond’s
terms on maturity (no acceleration), whereas creditors could only sue North
Rhine-Westphalia for its 20% share in the Frankfurt courts. Only North Rhine-
Westphalia’s debt would be accelerated.
The second option is for an existing international organization, or another
dedicated international organization, to issue debt Eurobonds. The Eurozone as
such – which does not have legal personality – is not an option as the issuer for
Eurobonds. Nor is the European Union the appropriate organization to assume
the task of issuing Eurobonds, given the lack of congruence between EU and
Eurozone membership.
The ESM is an international financial institution established by treaty and
expressly vested with international legal personality (Article 2, ESM Treaty). Like
other international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the ESM borrows on
capital markets to fulfill its stability mandate. The issuer is the ESM itself. The
debt instruments the ESM issues are governed by English Law, and the courts of
Luxembourg-City have exclusive jurisdiction to settle any disputes.27
27 Article 12.1 (governing law) and Article 12 (2) (jurisdiction), Master Dealer Agreement
Relating to European Stability Mechanism Debt Issuance Programme, 9 March 2015.
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When international organizations borrow, their member states are not, as a
rule, liable instead of, or in addition to, the organization for the organization’s
debts (Amerashinge, 2005:363).28 The organizational veil is respected. If the ESM
were to default, for instance, the Eurozone member states would not be respon-
sible for the entire stock of the ESM’s outstanding debt instruments. The ESM is
responsible for the ESM’s debts; Eurozone member states are not liable; they
only guarantee to the extent of their guarantees the ESM’s liabilities (the ESM
benefits only from a several, and not a joint and several guarantee of all member
states). Article 8(4) of the ESM Treaty expressly states that “[n]o ESM Member
shall be liable, by reason of its membership, for obligations of the ESM”.
Article 8(4) restates an established rule of customary international law.
When the International Tin Council collapsed, the English courts concluded,
with respect to “direct actions” by creditors against the member states of the
Council, a commodity organization that was unable to fulfill its financial obliga-
tions, that its member states were not secondarily liable for the organization’s
debts, let alone jointly and severally liable.29
4.2 Form of debt mutualization
It is unclear what exactly “mutualization of debt” means under existing
Eurobond proposals. The term “joint and several” and “debt mutualization”
are used loosely in most Eurobond proposals. This design feature of
Eurobonds is important because the economic effect of Eurobonds is likely to
depend on what model of joint liability/guarantees the Eurozone chooses. And
the legality of Eurobonds too may hinge on these features.
Expressions that are used include, “collective liability” (Donovan, 2012);
“joint-and-several liabilities of the Eurozone” (Philippon and Hellwig, 2011);
“joint and several liability” and “joint and several guarantee” (Delpla and von
Weizsäcker, 2010).30 Tirole (2015) speaks of full joint-and-several liability (as well
as “cross-insurance”). This section looks at these terms from the perspective of
28 The issue of the liability of Member States for the acts of an international organization arose
for example in relation to NATO’s bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. The
FRY instituted proceedings against 10 NATO Member States, claiming they were jointly and
severally responsible for NATO’s conduct.
29 See Lord Templeman’s judgment (at p. 476D, 480B-D, 483C, 509B-F, 511B-C, 512E-G, 513B-C,
983–4) in International Tin Council Case, JH Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of Trade
and Industry, [1989] 3 WLR 969.
30 Even though their 2011 paper speaks only of “joint and several guarantee” (Delpla and von
Weizsäcker, 2011).
650 M. Waibel
Brought to you by | Cambridge University Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 9/5/17 1:01 PM
English law – a defensible choice given the importance of English law to inter-
national financial transactions, and given the possible choice of English law as
the governing law of Eurobonds.31
In fact, both “joint and several liability” and a “joint and several guarantee”
are unlikely. There is an essential difference between a liability and a guarantee.
None of the proposals for Eurobonds seems to involve genuine joint and several
liability (involving all Eurozone countries as issuers), or joint and several guar-
antees (involving all but the issuing Eurozone country as guarantors). Joint and
several liability means that a creditor can sue a single debtor for the entire debt.
Such terminological confusion also occurs in related contexts. For example,
Schelkle (2012) maintains that Eurozone member states have joint and several
liability for losses of the European Central Bank. However, the relevant provi-
sion, Article 33 (2) of the ECSB Statute, speaks of loss being offset “against the
monetary income in proportion and up to the amounts allocated to national
central banks”.
Where a plurality of debtors (two or more) assume contractual obligations
vis-à-vis creditors, we distinguish three types of liability: (1) joint; (2) several
and; (3) joint and several (Treitel, 2003:Ch. 14). Importantly, there is a single
obligation of two or more debtors. A debtor who pays more than its fair share
of a shared obligation may have a claim for contribution against the other
debtors.
First, if a plurality of debtors has joint liability, then they are each fully
liable for the performance of the relevant debt obligation. The debtors’ liability is
joint if each Eurozone country issues debt binding all Eurozone member states.
A creditor can look to a single Eurozone state for payment, ignoring other
Eurozone member state debtors. It can recover 100% of the outstanding princi-
pal and interest from this single debtor, irrespective of that debtor’s responsi-
bility. Performance by one Eurozone state discharges the others. English law
presumes joint liability where two or more debtors contract together. However,
that presumption can be rebutted by clear and specific words of severance.32
Second, several (pro rata, separate or proportionate) liability occurs when
two or more debtors make separate promises to creditors. Each debtor is liable
only for its own specified obligations. If one debtor is unable to satisfy its
obligation, the other debtor(s) are not liable for the former’s share.
Third, joint and several liability arises when two or more debtors jointly
promise to pay their creditor(s) and also severally make separate promises to
31 The ESM’s financial instruments are already governed by English law.
32 White v Tyndall [1888] 13 App Cas 263.
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make payment (Amerndariz and Williamson, 1993).33 Creditors can enforce the
debt, in full, against any of the jointly liable debtors. And each party is inde-
pendently liable for the full extent of the debt. The debtors in effect tell their
creditors: “we, and each of us, will pay”. Eurozone states are extremely unlikely
to accept joint and several liability for Eurobonds.
Such liability would mean that the creditor could sue a single member of the
Eurozone (ignoring all other potential Eurozone debtors) and recover 100% from
it, irrespective of that debtor’s share of responsibility. Joint-and-several liability
would mean, for example, that Malta (with a GDP of around 11 billion Euros)
would be liable for the Eurozone’s entire debt stock (around 10 trillion Euros, or
900 times the Maltese GDP). With joint and several liability, creditors are
entitled to collect full repayment from any subset of the debtors, including
just a single debtor, so we would expect creditors to look to the debtor with
the highest creditworthiness/deepest pockets for repayment (Miceli, 1997:37).
The example of Malta illustrates that joint and several liability of a plurality of
Eurozone member state debtors is inconceivable economically and politically.
In contrast to primary liability, guarantees involve promises to pay another’s
debt if the debtor fails to pay (Peel and Treitel, 2011:para. 5.014; Andrews and
Millett, 2015:1–004).34 There is one debtor, but that debtor’s obligations (or some
of them) are guaranteed by a third party. It is a promise to answer such a
liability in case of default of the debtor. The guarantee contract is ancillary to
the principal contract. The principal remains primarily liable to the creditor. And
the guarantor only becomes liable once the principal has failed to perform its
obligations (secondary liability to the extent of the guarantee’s liability). The
liability arises under the principal contract, in our case the Eurobond.
Guarantees are often limited, as in the case of the European Financial
Stability Facility (EFSF). The EFSF and ESM guarantee structure may be a
model for the Eurobonds, with a guarantee proportionate to each country’s
guarantee liabilities (for example based on ECB capital shares) (Zandstra,
2011:297). Guarantees also exist in the three permutations, joint, several and
joint and several, in cases where there is a plurality of guarantors.
33 Joint and several liability was initially the formula for succession into the debts of the Soviet
Union – though this formula led to serious problems and the G7 modified it in 1992, with Russia
taking on all the debts, except for a 16% share assumed by Ukraine.
34 Lep Air Services v Rolloswin Investments Ltd [1973] A.C. 331; Wardens and Commonalty of the
Mystery of Mercers of the City of London v. New Hampshire Insurance Company (1991) 3 J.I.B.F.L.
144, Philipps J, citing with approval the following definition of a guarantee given in Mackay
(2008), para. 1013: “A guarantee is an accessory contract by which the promisor undertakes to
be answerable to the promise for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person, whose
primary liability to the promise must exist or be contemplated”.
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Guarantees of sovereign bonds are common: the US government regularly
guarantees the loans and bonds of other states, such as Israel,35 Jordan,36 and
Tunisia. The same applies to other states such as Japan.37 International organi-
zations also occasionally guarantee sovereign and quasi-sovereign bonds.38 As
Esteves and Tuncer (2016) show in their article in this issue, guarantees are also
important.
The choice of joint obligation or guarantee may affect the legality of
Eurobonds. Article 125 TFEU rules out guarantees to support borrowing by a
member state, or the assumption of liability for “commitments of another
member State”.39 If, however, the 17 Eurozone states were to issue a bond jointly
with several liability – following the model of the 2013 German Bund-Länder-
Anleihe – Article 125 TFEU would unlikely stand in the way. They would not
assume liability for “commitments of another member state”. Instead, they
would assume a shared obligation with all other Eurozone member states.
Table 1 notes and compares the main features of the different Eurobond
proposals in light of the article’s discussion of how these proposals would differ
in terms of international legal personality, governing law, issuer, and form of
debt mutualization.
As illustrated by this paper, one key question is whether Eurozone area
states disappear as borrowers. But existing proposals are by and large ambig-
uous on whether a “European Debt Management Agency” will take the place of
Eurozone member states as the issuer of sovereign bonds. This is a critical
question not only from the point of view of whether and how member states
are liable for Eurobonds, but also for the operation of covenants in existing debt
instruments by member states.
35 22 U.S. Code § 2186 – Loan guarantees to Israel program.
36 USAID, Government of Jordan Issues $1.5 Billion in Bonds with U.S. Guarantees (2015),
www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/jun-30-2015-government-jordan-issues-15-bil
lion-bonds-us-guarantees (last visited 8 June 2016).
37 Japan Bank for International Cooperation, Government-Guaranteed Bonds in International
Markets, www.jbic.go.jp/en/ir/government (last visited 8 June 2016).
38 World Bank, New World Bank Guarantee Helps Ghana Secure $1 Billion, 15-Year Bond
(2015), www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2015/11/18/new-world-bank-guarantee-helps-
ghana-secure-us1billion-15-year-bond (last visited 8 June 2016). And MIGA’s guarantee of bor-
rowing by Hungarian state-owned Eximbank: The world of sovereign bond guarantees, Reuters
Global Investing, http://blogs.reuters.com/globalinvesting/2013/07/19/the-world-of-sovereign-
bond-guarantees (last visited 8 June 2016).
39 The ESM does not breach Article 125, Thomas Pringle v. The Government of Ireland, Ireland
and the Attorney General, C-370/12, Judgment, 27 November 2012, para 146.
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5 Conclusion
The paper started out with an overview of the development of the law governing
sovereign bonds and an assessment of the potential relevance of international
law for Eurobonds. It concluded that international law would only apply in the
background, to specific issues, and in no way prevent the introduction of
Eurobonds. Further, after observing the gradual change in the governance of
sovereign bonds throughout the twentieth century, characterized by a shift from
domestic law to external private law, it was suggested that the main question
with respect to Eurobonds is which domestic governing law Eurozone member
states will choose.
The paper then proceeded to assess the two potential sources of non-discri-
mination obligations for sovereign bonds, observing that contractual obligations
not to discriminate fall short of a general equal treatment obligation and that
international law is likely to come into play only in extreme cases in the form of
international investment law. The paper then looked at whether the Eurobond
proposals move in the direction of an explicit seniority structure for sovereign
debt and whether they would include contractual non-discrimination obligations.
In Section 4 the three main possibilities for the issuer of Eurobonds
(Eurozone member states collectively, following the model of the German
Bund-Länder-Anleihe of 2013; an existing or future international organization
similar to the ESM; a private entity modeled on the EFSF) were discussed.
Table 1: Comparison of legal features of Eurobond proposals.
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Finally, the expressions used in the Eurobond proposals concerning the mutua-
lization of debt (“collective liability”; “joint-and-several liabilities of the
Eurozone”; “joint and several liability”; “joint and several guarantee”) were
deciphered by looking at the terms from the perspective of English law and
distinguishing three types of liability: (1) joint; (2) several and; (3) joint and
several.
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